Caixin
Sep 10, 2024 08:05 PM
FINANCE

In Depth: China’s Never-Ending Bond Bull Run Fuels Speculation Regulators May Intervene

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Over the past year, China’s bond market has witnessed a surge in trading activities, driven primarily by an influx of funds into long-term government bonds.

The central bank has repeatedly issued warnings, and some large banks have come under investigation for selling long-term bonds and making illegal transactions, leading to speculation that regulators might intervene in the bond investments of financial institutions.

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  • China's bond market has surged due to increased investment in long-term government bonds despite regulatory warnings and investigations into illegal transactions by banks.
  • Interest rate cuts in July led to record-low yields on 10-year bonds (below 2.1%) and 30-year bonds (below 2.3%) by August, raising concerns about market risks.
  • Regulatory bodies like NAFMII are increasing oversight to curb misconduct and ensure stable market conditions, particularly among smaller financial institutions.
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Over the past year, significant trading activity has surged in China’s bond market, primarily driven by extensive investment in long-term government bonds [para. 1]. The central bank has repeatedly issued warnings, with some large banks currently being investigated for selling long-term bonds and engaging in illegal transactions, suggesting potential regulatory intervention in financial institutions' bond investments [para. 2].

Since early 2024, yields on 10-year and 30-year government bonds have dropped over 40 and 50 basis points respectively, with prices reaching record highs by August [para. 3]. Experts caution that persistent market trends can build up risk, potentially triggering reversals during external shocks, such as the 2022 redemption wave of China’s wealth-management products [para. 4]. Xu Zhong of the National Association of Financial Market Institutional Investors (NAFMII) emphasizes the central bank’s goal to prevent systemic risks as bond prices surge amid falling yields [para. 5].

While experts predict the central bank is unlikely to directly interfere with financial institutions' decisions, the warnings appear to serve as a caution against overly aggressive investment practices, although some banks have misunderstood this and halted bond trading altogether [para. 6]. On August 5, long-term bond yields hit historic lows, following two interest rate cuts in July that affected various rates [para. 8]. This steep yield decline reflects both falling yields across all credit grades and a growing preference among investors for long-term bonds, prompted by market expectations of rate cuts by the U.S. Federal Reserve and China’s monetary policy shifts [para. 11].

Strategic market manipulation by some financial institutions has further contributed to market volatility, in addition to macroeconomic imbalances [para. 12]. With weak loan demand and lower loan interest rates, banks turned to bond investments, although a slow issuance of government bonds has created a supply-demand imbalance, driving down yields [para. 14]. The volatility has also been driven by speculative trading by smaller financial institutions and individual investors treating bonds like stocks [para. 15]. Small and medium-sized banks are increasingly relying on bond-trading profits, raising concerns about their ability to manage interest rate risks [para. 16].

The flattening yield curve of Chinese government bonds highlights a significant market shift as the central bank emphasizes maintaining a normal upward-sloping yield curve to encourage investment [para. 17]. Following market corrections, analysts speculated on the acceptable range for long-term bond yields, noting that the 10-year yield had reached a 20-year low below sustainable levels [para. 19]. Despite monitoring the risks associated with falling bond yields, the central bank has not set explicit targets [para. 20].

In balancing its policies, the central bank has simultaneously warned against the rapid fall in yields while reducing reserve ratios and interest rates to stimulate the economy [para. 24][para. 25]. Since April, it has issued several risk alerts and suggested possible interventions to stabilize yields, eventually conducting operations to control yields and reiterating warnings about risks tied to heavily bond-invested asset management products [para. 25][para. 26]. Without adequate risk management, aggressive investments by smaller financial institutions could lead to significant impacts reminiscent of the 2023 Silicon Valley Bank collapse [para. 27]. Rural and urban commercial banks' aggressive bond purchasing has contrasted with large banks’ focus on lending [para. 28].

The booming bond market has driven demand for asset management products, raising concerns about mass redemptions if market reversals occur, as seen in 2022 [para. 29]. The central bank’s stress tests are designed to evaluate institutions' vulnerability to bond market fluctuations [para. 34].

Regulators have heightened their crackdown on illegal activities in the bond market, particularly targeting smaller financial institutions for violations such as market price manipulations and illegal profit transfers [para. 36][para. 38]. NAFMII aims to work with the People’s Bank of China to enhance regulatory oversight and introduce stricter rules and sanctions for market compliance [para. 39].

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Who’s Who
BOC International
According to the article, analysts at BOC International reported that a 10-year yield below 2.2% might be unsustainable. They suggested that the central bank prefers yields to stay between 2.2% and 2.3%.
Silicon Valley Bank
The article mentions the collapse of Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) in 2023 as a point of comparison for the risks faced by smaller financial institutions in China's bond market. It highlights concerns about inadequate risk management and the significant impacts on balance sheets that could arise if market expectations reverse.
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What Happened When
2024:
China's bond market saw a surge in trading activities driven by funds flowing into long-term government bonds.
Since the start of 2024:
The yield on 10-year government bonds fell by more than 40 basis points and the yield on 30-year bonds dropped by over 50 basis points.
April 3, 2024:
The central bank first cautioned about changes in long-term yields.
June 2024:
Central bank governor Pan Gongsheng emphasized the importance of maintaining a normal upward-sloping yield curve.
June 2024:
Urban commercial banks traded more than 9 trillion yuan ($1.3 trillion) in bonds, while rural commercial banks accounted for 7.5 trillion yuan.
Late June 2024:
The central bank's second-quarter monetary policy report stated that the 10-year bond yield had reached a 20-year low of 2.2%.
Early August 2024:
Bond prices hit record highs.
August 5, 2024:
Long-term government bond yields reached record lows, with the 10-year bond yield falling below 2.1% and the 30-year bond yield dropping below 2.3%.
August 7, 2024:
NAFMII released a notice stating that four rural commercial banks in Jiangsu province were suspected of manipulating market prices and illegally transferring profits when trading government bonds.
AI generated, for reference only
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