Editorial: Clearing the Obstacles to the Three-Child Policy’s Success

The road map for China’s three-child policy is gradually becoming clear. On Tuesday, the “Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the State Council on Optimizing the Fertility Policy and Promoting the Long-term Balanced Development of the Population” was published. The decision clearly outlines the policy, deploying specific supporting measures and explicitly imposing requirements for improving prenatal and postnatal care services, developing a child care services system beneficial to all families, and reducing the costs of childbirth, parenting and education. The introduction of a series of detailed measures is expected to follow, leading to further changes in China’s fertility policy.

China’s fertility rate has long been on the decline. The country’s total fertility rate has been below the replacement level of 2.1 since 1992, and last year, according to the seventh national population census, this figure fell to 1.3, to great public surprise and concern. In addition, accepted notions of fertility have gradually changed, with many members of the public not daring or wanting to have children. So it is too early to tell how effective the three-child policy can be. Many people have made suggestions designed to encourage fertility, such as introducing preferential tax and housing purchase policies, in order to support families with two or three children. But in fact, the solution to the fertility problem lies in prioritizing the removal of various obstacles hindering fertility, rather than in policies offering incentives. Prominent impediments to fertility include the high costs and heavy economic burden of childbirth, parenting and education, a shortage of child care institutions and the direct effect of having children on women’s career development. The decision makes detailed, targeted arrangements to accelerate the development of a child care service system benefiting all families and toward significantly reducing the cost of childbirth, parenting and education prior to 2025. It is widely hoped that these measures will be implemented as soon as possible.

China’s fertility policy has gradually been relaxed, from the one-child policy, to a universal two-child policy, and now to the three-child policy. A long-term issue, balanced population development requires policymakers to have an in-depth understanding of the factors influencing population development, and to develop forward-looking measures. The slowdown in China’s population growth was inevitable. And in future, China’s demographic evolution is set to follow a path already trodden by developed countries. During the 14th Five-Year Plan period, China will enter a “stage of moderate aging” and then a “stage of severe aging” around 2035. Scholars predict that China’s population will peak in the next few years. In other words, China’s population will never much exceed 1.4 billion people. All of the countermeasures included in the decision were introduced under these basic constraints. Although fertility policy is unlikely to be able to change these trends, it can release some additional potential fertility, reducing as much as possible the economic and social impact of an aging population and low fertility rate.

On the other hand, China is approaching a transient “window” to encourage fertility. The 1986-1990 period was generally regarded as China’s third baby boom. At that time, young people born in the previous (1960s and 1970s) baby boom reached marrying and childbearing age, but, facing the tight restrictions of the one-child policy, the third baby boom came to be known as the “shadow baby boom.” Now, the third generation of baby boomers — based on their ages — has entered the final “window.” If the opportunity presented by that period is missed, fertility policy, however powerful, will be much less effective than expected. Thus it is very important that policies eliminating the pain points and difficulties involved in having children are formulated and deployed as quickly as possible.

It will be impossible to eliminate these pain points and difficulties overnight, but their removal should be prioritized by degree of urgency and difficulty, and concrete measures should be rolled out in a staged, planned fashion. That is, the easy problems should be solved immediately, and the root causes of the harder ones should be determined, with space and time devoted to resolving them. For example, the abolition of social maintenance fees, the review and repeal of fertility-related penalties, and the complete decoupling of residence registration, school admissions and employment from individual birth status could all certainly be implemented as soon as possible. But shortages of child care institutions and primary and secondary schools are also impeding increases in fertility rates. The decision calls for the construction of a batch of accessible, affordable, good-quality child care institutions, and increased coverage of kindergartens benefiting all families. With timely and appropriate implementation, this could bear fruit in the near future.

Regarding reforms resolving more difficult problems, such as imbalances in compulsory education resources, accommodation shortages in school districts, and the high housing prices underlying these, determined step-by-step moves, visible to the public, and which will build public confidence, should be taken. Although these may not take effect quickly, they should stabilize public expectations. The linkages between education and household registration and between school enrollment and housing actually reflect sticking points deep in the system of national governance. Even within a particular city, there are clear differences between school districts, and the distribution of educational resources is extremely uneven. Not to mention the huge educational gap between urban and rural areas. In fact, the “shackles” imposed by these linkages relate not only to the population problem, but are also crucial for addressing “the contradiction between unbalanced and inadequate development and the people’s ever-growing need for a better life,” and a tough issue confronting comprehensively deepening reform. But in supporting fertility, advocating an initial focus on easy problems, before moving onto difficult ones, does not imply that the difficult problems can be evaded. The effectiveness of these policies will ultimately largely depend on whether the tough issues can be cracked.

The most stubborn obstacle to pro-fertility policies is conceptual, especially the dated idea that “population is a burden.” At this point, a clear-cut stand should be taken to encouraging having children. The decision requires that CPC committees, and governments at all levels, improve their political stance and enhance their awareness of national conditions and policies, and that top officials personally take overall responsibility. From this, it is not difficult to appreciate the urgency of addressing the population problem for China’s decision makers. Thus, local governments and departments must abandon their long-established traditional “limited reproduction” thinking. In the 1980s, the introduction of the one-child policy was aimed solely at containing the rapid population growth of that time. In September 1980, the CPC’s Central Committee stated in an open letter to all party members, and members of the Chinese Communist Youth League, that “In thirty years, when the great population problem has eased, a different population policy can be adopted.” Obviously, the responsibility to make timely adjustments to population policy now rests with the successors of those policymakers.

International experience informs us that once a country’s population begins to shrink, reversing that trend becomes almost impossible. A key variable in relation to China’s economic and social development, population growth has a direct bearing on whether the Chinese nation can continue to thrive and prosper. Only by resolutely, comprehensively and thoroughly removing obstacles to the three-child policy’s effectiveness can we create conditions favoring China’s long-term economic and social development.

Contact editor Michael Bellart (michaelbellart@caixin.com)

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